The mechanism of managerial herd behavior is analyzed and the payment contract to avoid this behavior is designed and discussed.
本文将研究对象拓展至一般企业经理人，分析经理人羊群行为的发生机制，并讨论规避此行为的报酬合约设计。
This paper analyzed the option like feature of venture capitalist s compensation contract applying principal-agent theory.
应用委托代理理论,在标准的道德风险模型中增加风险变量和有限责任约束,分析了创业投资家的报酬合约特征。
A Payment Contract Research on Herd Behavior of Manager;
基于报酬合约的经理人羊群行为研究
Informational Cascade,Herd Behavior of Manager and Payment Contract;
信息追随、管理者从众行为与报酬合约
Where otherwise agreed to in a contract, remuneration may be paid in accordance with the terms of the said contract.
合同另有约定的，也可以按照合同支付报酬。
On a Modei of Combinational Compensation Contract Under Asymmetric Information;
信息不对称条件下企业家组合报酬契约模型初探
Convention on Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value
男女工人同值工作同等报酬公约
John headed the hospital's building campaign for love.
约翰凭个人兴趣无报酬领导着医院的建设事务。
Payment Contract Design with Application under Fairness Preference;
公平偏好下的报酬契约设计及应用研究
The Research on the Relationship between Executive Compensation Contract and Corporate Performance;
经理人报酬契约与企业业绩关联性问题研究
Payment Contract Design and Agency Cost Analysis Based on Fairness Preference;
基于公平心理的报酬契约设计及代理成本分析
The Growth Model with Increasing Return to Scale;
规模报酬递增的增长模型——李约瑟之谜解释
Accounting Information and the Managerial Compensation Contracts:A Literature Review;
会计信息与管理者报酬激励契约研究综述
The Choice of Achievement Evaluation Index in Operator s Reward Encouragement Bond;
经营者激励报酬契约中业绩评价指标的选择
Implicit Incentives of Accomplishment and Improve Reward Contract of Manager;
业绩的隐性激励与经理报酬契约的改进
Analyses on Design of Payment Contract and Encouraging Intension of Managers;
企业经营者报酬契约设计与激励强度分析
Management Remuneration Contract and Opportunism and Efficiency in Accounting Policy Choosing.;
管理报酬契约与会计政策选择中的机会主义
The anylysis of the choice of performance evaluation standard in managers payment contract;
浅析经营者报酬契约中业绩评价标准的选择
Reward contract and agency costs on comparative performance information;
基于相对业绩比较的报酬契约与代理成本分析
The Reconstitution of Defferred Probable Compensation and the Incentive and Restrict System;
延迟或有性报酬与国企激励约束机制的重构